Danger Room

U.S. and Romanian Special Forces train Afghan forces in Laghman Province. Photo: David Axe

Part one of a two-part series.

LAGHMAN, Afghanistan — The American Special Forces officer was having what one colleague says was the worst day of his war tour. And that was before the Soviet-made anti-personnel mine packed with 700 ball bearings exploded at his feet.

A weapon like that can turn a man into “pink mist,” the officer says.

It was late September outside the town of Mehtar Lam, in this hilly province just east of Kabul. The officer from the Germany-based 10th Special Forces Group — let’s call him “Tom” — had been leading his patrol of U.S. commandos and Afghan police trainees on the long walk back to base following a disappointing encounter with Taliban fighters in which half of the trainees failed to fight back.

Tom glimpsed a mound of disturbed earth and, not thinking, approached it.

The mine concealed inside the mound was a dud, its main charge decayed by time and neglect. Only a precursor charge went off, resulting in a “pop” sound that sent the officer into a spasm of action. He gave a hand signal that sent his troops running for cover, in case the malfunctioned mine was just the first salvo in complex ambush. “God, please don’t let me fuck up,” he recalls thinking.

But the mine was apparently meant to be a stand-alone attack. Nothing else exploded. No Taliban fighters opened up with machine guns, AK-47s and rocket-propelled grenades. Only after realizing this did Tom have the luxury of feeling anything. “My first reaction was anger,” Tom says. Anger not only at his would-be attackers, but also at himself. Walking up to the mine “was a JV [junior varsity] move,” he admits.

Tom’s frustration deepened as he tried to get his Afghan police trainees to learn from the mistake. The tall Special Forces officer, in his late 30s with a shaved head and a thick beard, recalls showing the now-harmless explosive device to one of his best Afghan cops, who would later earn a reputation for charging straight into enemy fire.

The American’s aim was to teach the Afghan to fear explosives, and keep a close watch for them in the future. “But he didn’t get it,” Tom recalls. To the cop, avoiding a bomb blast isn’t a function of superior tactics or, failing that, luck born of the device’s long neglect by insurgent fighters. No, the troops’ lucky escape from the fizzling mine “was a direct representation of the intervention of God,” Tom says.

For six months, Tom and the approximately 18 U.S. and Romanian commandos he leads have struggled to prepare a new, largely unknown style of Afghan police unit — a Provincial Response Company — to begin enforcing some real law and order in Laghman, a violent, Rhode Island-sized province of some 400,000 people.

It’s all part of the international coalition’s evolving plan to turn over all of Afghanistan to local security forces by the end of 2014, steadily withdrawing conventional combat troops while reinforcing the Special Operations Forces — including the U.S. Army’s Green Berets, NATO commando formations, the highly secretive Army Delta Force and U.S. Navy SEALs — that will stay behind.

This “Special Force-ization” of the Afghanistan War is no panacea. Special Forces pride themselves in their ability to work within any culture. They blend in, live off the land, learn the local languages and customs, forge unlikely alliances and adapt, endlessly adapt, in pursuit of subtle strategic goals. “We’re problem-solvers,” Tom says.

But as cultural problems go, Afghanistan is a particularly difficult one for outsiders. Understanding the rugged, landlocked country can be hard, even for highly trained warriors like Tom.  A decade into the U.S.-led intervention, the coalition is still learning this important truth.

Tom’s futile lesson in bomb-avoidance was, in the balance, a minor failure — but one indicative of a much deeper problem, one that will continue to shape international efforts in Afghanistan as the conflict enters its new “Special” phase.

“Look at the magnitude of the problem,” he says. “I am not cynical about this, but I recognize the magnitude. Lots of people frame the problem in simplistic terms that are not realistic.”

Among those unrealistic terms: the idea that Afghanistan’s problems can be resolved quickly, and by mere killing. Boosting security in Afghanistan means reinforcing the rule of law. That’s a daunting, long-term process requiring more education and institutional reform than combat, Tom notes.

Fortunately, education and reform in a conflict zone are two of Special Forces’ unique strengths. More and more, the Afghanistan War is a commando war. That can mean high-profile, lethal raids such as the May killing of Osama Bin Laden by U.S. Navy SEALs. More so, it means specialized troops negotiating what is, for many Westerners, a confusing and frustrating culture — all in an effort to help Afghans help themselves. And in a deadly country where dud bombs are the least of the perils.

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